Richard Hickock’s severe character disorder

Richard Hickock’s severe character disorder is the psychiatric formulation Dr. W. Mitchell Jones developed for the defense, not a finding the trial fully tested or placed before the jury. Jones’s account presents a marked contradiction: Richard Hickock could understand what he was doing and remain in contact with reality, yet repeatedly acted with poor control, little regard for consequences, and apparent inability to learn from experience. The courtroom’s narrow rules allowed the jury to hear only a fraction of that assessment, while the unresolved possibility of brain damage limited how conclusive it could be.

Assessment and Legal Limits

Asked for his opinion, Jones said that, within the usual definitions, Richard Hickock knew right from wrong. Those definitions were governed by the M’Naghten rule, which required a restricted answer to the question of legal understanding. The defense attorney sought qualification, but the prosecution objected when Jones tried to elaborate. The objection was upheld: under Kansas law, the relevant question permitted only a yes-or-no response, and Jones was dismissed.

The book then supplies the testimony Jones would have given had the court allowed him to continue. This distinction matters: the detailed clinical portrait is presented as excluded testimony, rather than as evidence the jury actually heard in full. Jones considered Richard Hickock above average in intelligence, quick to grasp new ideas, broadly informed, alert to his surroundings, logically organized, and in good contact with reality. He found no sign of confusion or disorientation. These observations ruled against a simple account of incapacity, even as the rest of the evaluation described substantial emotional and behavioral difficulties.

Impulsivity and Repeating Conduct

Jones described Richard Hickock as impulsive and prone to acting without considering future discomfort or consequences for himself and others. He appeared unable to learn from experience. His behavior followed an uneven pattern: periods of productive activity gave way to conspicuously irresponsible actions. Frustration that another person might tolerate was difficult for him to manage, and Jones said he was poorly able to relieve it except through antisocial behavior.

The assessment therefore connected conduct to a recurring difficulty, rather than treating each irresponsible act as an isolated lapse. Awareness and action could coexist: Jones’s formulation specifically treated Richard Hickock’s knowledge of what he was doing, and his decision to proceed, as an especially clear indication of emotional abnormality. Yet the proposed account did not say that he lacked an understanding of right and wrong. Its central tension was that comprehension did not reliably govern behavior.

Self-Image and Relationships

Jones described Richard Hickock’s self-esteem as very low, with concealed feelings of inferiority and sexual inadequacy. In the proposed testimony, these feelings were overcompensated for by fantasies of wealth and power, boasting about exploits, and spending sprees when money was available. He was dissatisfied with the slow advancement he could expect from ordinary employment. The report thus linked grander self-presentation and ambitious fantasies to a fragile sense of personal worth, without treating those gestures as proof of confidence.

Jones also considered Richard Hickock uncomfortable in relationships and pathologically unable to form and maintain enduring personal attachments. Although he professed ordinary moral standards, Jones judged that those standards did not meaningfully influence his actions. Taken together, these observations describe distance between declared values and practical conduct, and between the wish to appear powerful and an underlying sense of inadequacy. They are components of Jones’s proposed clinical explanation, not independent proof of a particular motive for any one act.

Head Injury and Unresolved Cause

Jones had found no usual signs of organic brain damage, such as memory loss, concrete concept formation, or intellectual deterioration. He nevertheless could not rule out residual damage. Hospital records verified that Richard Hickock had suffered a serious head injury with concussion and several hours of unconsciousness in 1950. Richard Hickock reported blackout spells, periods of amnesia, and headaches afterward, and Jones observed that a major portion of his antisocial behavior had occurred since the injury.

That sequence raised a possible connection, not a demonstrated cause. Richard Hickock had never undergone the medical tests that could establish or disprove residual brain damage, and Jones said definitive testing was needed before a complete evaluation could be claimed. The report therefore held two propositions in balance: its behavioral account identified a severe character disorder, while a potentially significant neurological contribution remained uninvestigated. Jones summarized the former as a fairly typical severe character disorder, but stressed that any brain damage, if present, might have substantially influenced behavior in the preceding years and at the time of the crime.

Narrative Context and Significance

The clinical portrait sits beside the book’s earlier depiction of Richard Hickock as practical and literal-minded, contrasted with Perry Smith’s more imaginative self-presentation. In one remembered exchange, Perry Smith tried to win Richard Hickock’s respect by recounting an attack on a man named King, presenting it as evidence of toughness. The narrative subsequently establishes that Perry Smith had known King but had not assaulted him. Later, when investigators repeated Richard Hickock’s version of the story, Perry Smith reacted with surprise and anger, said Richard Hickock had believed the tale, and claimed he had nearly shot him. The episode shows how a fabricated boast and the prospect of betrayal complicate the men’s partnership; it does not establish the clinical cause of Richard Hickock’s behavior.

The assessment’s significance lies partly in its incompleteness. The jury received the narrow legal answer that Richard Hickock knew right from wrong, while the fuller account of impulsivity, unstable conduct, weak attachments, and possible neurological impairment was stopped by procedural limits. The book makes the distinction visible: legal responsibility, psychiatric description, and medical uncertainty overlap, but none simply settles the others.